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1. Debating the Limits of Interspecific Violence: Ancient and Modern Bioethics 
In the public debate of our times, scientific researchers and supporters of 
animal rights seem sometimes to pursue conflicting goals. Wide-ranging 
controversies have arisen over the bioethical implications of the use of 
animals in medical research, and a rift has apparently developed between 
two noble purposes: on the one hand, the discovery or refinement of 
therapeutic methods for human diseases; on the other, the respect for 
animal life and dignity. Seen from a similar perspective, human happiness 
and ecological behavior – the good of animals and that of men – run on 
parallel, if not diverging, tracks. 
No doubt, many contemporary theorists would argue that it is 
logically wrong to draw such a general conclusion from a very particular 
case, since there are plenty of other situations in which human and non-
human animals help (and depend on) each other. The standard concept of 
ecosystem, for instance, relies on the well-grounded assumption that every 
component of an enviroment – men, animals, plants, and even non-living 
beings like minerals – contributes to a delicate systemic balance creating 
mutual interrelations.1 Admittedly, the condition of mankind and the fate 
                                                 
1   As Norton, 1992, 26, pointed out, 'an ecological system has maintained its integrity – a 
stronger concept that includes the conditions of health – if it retains (1) the total 
diversity of the system – the sum total of the species and associations that have held 
sway historically – and (2) the systematic organization which maintains that diversity, 
including, especially, the system's multiple layers of complexity through time'. 
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of animals are connected through a highly complex network of 
relationships, which gives rise to puzzling, multi-faceted questions. 
It is notorious that many ancient authors were well aware of such 
morally significant issues. Even if the Greek and Roman world did not 
know genetic engineering, large-scale animal experiments, and industrial 
farming, its most sensitive intellectuals devoted careful reflection to the 
connection between knowledge, violence and the order of nature.2 In the 
present paper, I will take into account the particularly intriguing case of 
Seneca the Younger – a philosopher, poet, and man of power often assu-
med to pay exclusive attention to human matters.3 Far from ignoring the 
importance of man's relationship to the enviroment and other living 
beings, Seneca wrote a wide-ranging treatise on natural sciences – the 
Naturales Quaestiones – which attests his profound awareness of the ethical 
meaning of physics.4 Most importantly, the whole conception of human 
life and moral self-improvement emerging from the writer's works reflects 
the centrality of cosmology as an essential knowledge area allowing man 
to fulfil his natural vocation (in the terms of Stoic teleology).5 In Seneca's 
                                                                                                    
Notably, while the present-day ecosystemic approach sees man as part of the natural 
enviroment, the first upholders of ecological theories – such as the German biologist 
Ernst Heinrich Haeckel (1834-1919) – did not go so far. Only in the twentieth century 
(especially after the studies of the so-called Chicago School of Sociology, also known 
as the 'Ecological School'), researchers became accustomed to a comprehensive 
consideration of human life in its biological context. Nevertheless, as McIntosh 1985, 
12, remarked, the search for answers to some basic questions of modern ecology 'was 
based on the yearning for order and purpose in nature which pervades Western 
religion and philosophy'. Of course, the theoretical reflections carried out by classical 
thinkers played a prominent role in this respect, and in the present paper we will take 
into account cosmological views such as that of the Pythagorean school, which 
supposed a 'circle of life' of eschatological significance. 
2  The ethical-cultural relevance of human-animal interactions, in particular, was the object of 
thorough (and frequently conflicting) investigations: see the far-reaching surveys of 
Dierauer, 1977, Sorabji, 1993, and Osborne, 2007. 
3  As is well-known, an eminent part of traditional Senecan scholarship focused on the 
author's original humanism, variously compared to later Christian attitudes: see e. g. 
Grimal, 1978 and Chaumartin, 1985. 
4  See now the penetrating analysis of Williams, 2012, 3: 'a (perhaps the) dominating 
principle in the Natural Questions is that the study of nature is inseparable from reflec-
tion on human nature. For Seneca, by studying nature we free the mind from the 
restrictions and involvements of this life, liberating it to observe, and luxuriate in, the 
undifferentiated cosmic wholeness that is so distant from the fragmentations and the 
disruptions of our everyday experience'. 
5  Cf. especially Inwood, 2005, 157-200, and, from an even larger perspective, Wildber-
ger, 2006, who remarks on Seneca's peculiar inclination to use the description of man's 
role in the cosmos for paraenetic purposes (241-243). 
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view, no contradiction can arise between scientific research and ethical 
concerns, provided that both these fields of interest are correctly 
understood. In fact, while the investigation of physical phenomena 
(including, of course, zoological evidence) should mainly be aimed at a 
deeper understanding of nature's plans, the spiritual liberation of man-
kind is expected to ensue from cognitive enhancement. 
According to the Stoic tradition taken up and revived by Seneca, man 
is a kind of transitional being overtly favored by divine providence. As a 
fetus hiding in his mother's womb, he resembles a plant endowed with 
mere vegetative functions (φύσις), but when he grows into a child, he 
acquires those  sensory motor skills (ψυχὴ) which qualify him as an 
animal (ζῷον). Following Aristotle, however, Seneca and the Stoics see 
man as a linguistic and rational animal, for adulthood would entail the 
development of communication and logical abilities (λόγος).6 Remarkably, 
these abilities are not an unchangeable endowment acquired by man in a 
finished state; rather, the purpose of human existence – its own telos – is to 
perfect reason to such an extent that no difference but mortality divides 
man and god.7 Only the wise man, of course, succeeds in reaching such a 
                                                 
6  Indeed, the Stoic philosophy of nature narrowed and specified Aristotle's anthropolo-
gical paradigm by emphasizing the preeminence of internal reasoning over external 
language and sociability. In the Stoics' view, it is logical consciousness (λόγος ἐνδιάθε-
τος) – an exclusive prerogative of gods and men – which gives true meaning to 
phonatory abilities (λόγος προφορικὸς) and social inclinations. Thus, even if other 
animals, too, produce articulated sounds (e. g. crows and parrots) or tend to be 
gregarious (e. g. ants and bees), a genuine political community based on reason (and 
reasoned speech) can solely be found among men and gods (cf. Dierauer, 1977, 224-
238, Sorabji, 1993, 122-133, Labarrière 2005a). Moreover, as Labarrière, 2005b, 11-12, 
pointed out, a striking theoretical gap separates Aristotle's 'scientific' approach to 
animal life from the Stoic ethics-centred investigation of biological matters: in other 
words, the Aristotelian standpoint 'consiste à soutenir qu'il faut s'intéresser aux 
capacités animales de très près, ne serait-ce qu'afin de savoir en que l'homme se 
différencie exactement des “autres animaux”. Je qualifierai cette attitude de “scientifi-
que” parce que ca visée n'est d'emblée ni morale, ni religieuse, mais plutôt “epistémo-
logique” ou “gneséologique” […]. By contrast, the Stoic approach 's'inscrit dans une 
polémique sur l'art de vivre du sage et, plus genéralement, sur l'attitude que nous 
devons adopter vis-à-vis des autres animaux en fonction de la place de l'homme dans 
le cosmos […]. Refuser aux animaux la raison, toute forme d'intelligence ou de 
coscience, renforce ainsi la dimension clairement apologétique d'une doctrine s'enra-
cinant elle-même dans une théorie de la Providence que nous ne saurions confondre 
avec la téléologie aristotélicienne à l'oeuvre dans la science de la nature du Stagirite'. 
7 On the transitional nature of man in Stoic theory see Wildberger, 2006, 243: 'waehrend 
alles übrige was lebt, sein Dasein auf einer Pneuma-Stufe beginnt und auch auf dieser 
Stufe beendet, waehrend also eine Pflanze immer nur Leben hat, ein Tier (seit seiner 
Fabio Tutrone 514 
high goal, and his cognitive-moral status ideally coincides with the perfect 
rationality of the divine cosmos. That is why the sage (ὁ σοφὸς) is said to 
be the model of a life in accordance with nature (ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει 
ζῆν) – the most alluring and at the same time the most problematic Stoic 
precept.8 
Patently, the world conceived by the Stoics – the world at the centre of 
Seneca's scientific investigations and moral exhortations – is a very hierar-
chical, selective and anthropocentric one. As a rule, animals are excluded 
from any form of justice, since this is reputed to originate from the 
possession of reason.9 It is on the basis of their rationality that men and 
gods participate in a universal political community – a transnational (and 
indeed trans-human) cosmopolis which nonetheless rules out children and 
mentally impaired persons.10 Admittedly, in the lofty and dynamic form 
                                                                                                    
Geburt) immer nur eine Seele ohne Sprache und ein göttlicher Himmelskörper immer 
nur eine Seele mit vollkommener Sprache, ist der Mensch ein Zwischenwesen'. On 
Seneca's reception of such a morally relevant doctrine see especially the discussion of 
Ep. 124 (but cf. also Ep. 41.7-8; 74.14-18; 76.8-11; 118.12-14). 
8  Though admirably envisioned on a theoretical level, the Stoic overlapping of ratio-
nalism and naturalism inevitably involves a series of practical and logical ambiguities. 
See e. g. Long, 1996a, 150-151: 'if Stoic moral theory is unintelligible when divorced 
from Nature, how practible is their system when Nature is placed in its true perspe-
ctive? A human being is to live as Nature wills, that is: obedient to reason. But reason 
here means a sound reason, reason that accords consistently with Nature. How is one 
to know whether one's reason meets this condition? As far I can see, the Stoics gave 
no satisfactory answer to this question. What they did was to offer the sage as a para-
digm'. 
9  For a sound account of the Stoic theory of justice, with special regard to the status of 
non-human animals, see Sorabji, 1993, 122-133 and Wildberger, 2006, 244-275. From a 
wider perspective, see instead Inwood, 1985 and Schofield, 1995. 
10  It is noteworthy that Seneca himself provides us with meaningful evidence on this 
matter, for it has been often assumed that later Stoic thinkers (the Roman Stoics in 
particular) adopted a much more inclusive model of cosmopolitanism than Zeno and 
the first scholarchs (see Schofield, 1991, whose 'developmental' interpretation has 
been reasonably questioned by Sellars, 2007 and Vogt, 2008). While one may fruitfully 
discuss the differences between Zeno's city of sages and Epictetus' universal com-
munity, there is indeed no doubt about the Stoic exclusion of irrational and pre-rational 
beings from justice and moral life. In Ep. 124-7-10, for instance, Seneca assimilates 
children and embryos to plants and animals, stating that they all ignore the true good 
attained by reason; in particular, the child is said to be 'an animal not yet endowed 
with reason' (nondum rationale animal), inherently incapable of reaching goodness. 
Even more eloquent is the discussion of legal punishments in De ira 1.15-1-2, where 
the death penalty for irredeemable criminals is justified through a striking 
comparison with the killing of sick animals and deformed infants. Significantly, all 
these acts are described as necessary 'removals' based on reason and not on anger (nec 
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given to it by Stoic theory, reason or logos is a very demanding attribute. It 
is clearly not sufficient to belong to the human race (in a static, taxonomic 
sense) to be worth of the highest cosmological standing, since, as Katja 
Vogt remarked, even rational adults are mere inhabitants of the Stoic 
cosmopolis, the only true citizens being gods and wise men.11   
What is more relevant to our present concern, however, is that the 
exclusion of irrational animals from the field of justice is presented as a 
necessarary condition for the existence of human society. As Plutarch puts 
                                                                                                    
ira sed ratio est a sanis inutilia secernere). Likewise, in De ira 2.26.4-6, the Latin writer 
blames those who get angry with beasts, children and mentally impaired people 
(pueris et non multum a puerorum prudentia distantibus), arguing that, due to their 
unawareness (imprudentia), the behavior of such agents has no moral relevance. 
11 See Vogt, 2008 (esp. 65-110): according to Stoic philosophy, 'the law regulates the 
cosmos, and thus it ties all human beings together. But the law is identified with 
perfect reason, not with reason. A human being who is not wise does not live up to the 
law; she does not live a lawful life' (14). Since the Stoics have been frequently 
regarded as the first upholders of a theory of human rights (see e. g. Hadot, 1998, 311, 
or Mitsis, 1999), similar assertions can probably appear surprising. However, as Bett, 
2012 has pointed out through a careful re-examination of the Stoics' accounts on this 
matter, while it is true that 'there is a strand in their thinking that is encouraging to 
the notion of human rights, there are other strands that point in a very different 
direction, and that could not be abandoned without abandoning Stoicism itself'. In 
particular, 'despite the evidence for a Stoic notion of community among all human 
beings, we cannot deny that the Stoics assign a very special status to one type of hu-
man being, namely the sage. The sage's wise or virtuous demeanour, and the actions 
that flow from it, are of a value that is on a wholly different level from anything that 
the non-wise can hope to achieve. And this gulf between sages and everyone else has 
a number of consequences that make it very difficult to hold on to any notion of 
universal human rights'. In Derridean terms one coud say that the Stoics' logocentric 
approach to ethical issues and their emphasis on a sort of ascensional anthropological 
paradigm are intrinsically discriminating. By appealing to the classificatory relevance 
of cognitive criteria, in fact, a close connection is established between denigration of 
animals and marginalization of 'minor' humans. If one considers the profound 
influence of Stoic thought on later political conceptions, one might reasonably agree 
with Lévi-Strauss's famous (and controversial) claims about the origins of Western 
racism: 'by isolating man from the rest of creation and defining too narrowly the 
boundaries separating him from other living beings, the Western humanism inherited 
from antiquity and the Renaissance has deprived him of a bulwark; and, as the 
experiences of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have proved, has allowed him 
to be exposed and defenseless to attacks stirred up within the strongholf itself. This 
humanism has allowed even closer segments of humanity to be cast outside arbitrary 
frontiers to which it was all the easier to deny the same dignity as the rest of huma-
nity, since man had forgotten that he is worthy of respect more as a living being than 
as the lord and master of creation – a primary insight that should have induced him to 
show his respect for all living beings' (Lévi-Strauss, 1985, 23). 
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it in his lively dialogue On the Intelligence of Animals: 
The Stoics and Peripatetics strenuously agree on the other side, to the effect that 
justice could not then come into existence, but would remain completely without 
form or substance, if all the beasts partake of reason. For either we are necessarily 
unjust if we do not spare them; or, if we do not take them for food, life becomes 
impracticable or impossible; in a sense we shall be living the life of beasts once we 
give up the use of beasts.12 
Even though, as mentioned earlier, a sharp distinction should be 
maintained between Stoic and Aristotelian natural philosophy,13 the gene-
ral theoretical framework outlined by Plutarch with regard to the Stoics is 
indeed accurate and revealing. In particular, the connection established 
between anthropocentric rationalism and ethical-political theory reflects a 
focal point of Stoic doctrine. Notably, when describing the ruin of justice 
resulting from the inclusion of animals, Plutarch employs two rather 
uncommon adjectives (ἀσύστατος and ἀνύπαρκτος), which emphatically 
refer to the issue of social stability: if non-human beings were recognized 
to be rational – and thus to be endowed with natural rights, in accordance 
with the above-mentioned Stoic tenet – justice as a whole (δικαιοσύνη) 
would lack consistency (σύστασις) and truthfulness (ὕπαρ). In such an 
execrated catastrophic scenario, men would be forced to regress to the 
earliest stages of social evolution, the 'beastly' way of life (θηριώδης βίος) 
which is the object of various imaginative reconstructions among ancient 
philosophers.14 
Plutarch's work portrays a spirited conversation between supporters 
and detractors of animal intelligence which should have taken place a few 
                                                 
12  Plutarch, Soll. An. 963F-964A: οἱ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς καὶ τοῦ Περιπάτου μάλιστα πρὸς 
τοὐναντίον ἐντείνονται τῷ λόγῳ, τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἑτέραν γένεσιν οὐκ ἐχούσης, ἀλλὰ 
παντάπασιν ἀσυστάτου καὶ ἀνυπάρκτου γιγνομένης, | εἰ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις λόγου 
μέτεστι· γίγνεται γὰρ ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἀφειδοῦσιν αὐτῶν, ἢ μὴ χρωμένων 
αὐτοῖς τὸ ζῆν ἀδύνατον καὶ ἄπορον· καὶ τρόπον τινὰ θηρίων βίον βιωσόμεθα, τὰς ἀπὸ 
τῶν θηρίων προέμενοι χρείας (transl. Cherniss-Hembold, 1957). 
13  See above n. 6. 
14  On the literary and philosophical topos of the primitive men's beastly life see 
especially Dierauer, 1977, 25-39, who points out the influential role of Presocratic and 
sophistic reflections on this matter. The profound anthropological significance of the 
ancient accounts of primitive history comes out very clearly from the classical survey 
of Lovejoy-Boas, 1935 (260-286 on Seneca and Stocism). It is certainly no accident that 
Latin authors showed special interest in the subject and investigated consistently the 
transition from savagery to civilization: as the discussions of Cicero (Inv. 1.1-5), Sallust 
(Cat. 6.1-3; Iug. 18.1-2), and Lucretius (5.925-1010) indicate, it was the process itself of 
political aggregation – its nature, limits, and potential dangers – which attracted the 
attention of Roman intellectuals from the time of the Republican crisis onwards.  
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decades after Seneca's death.15 At that time – in the  prosperous years of 
the early Imperial period – the position of the most eminent philosophical 
traditions concerning the nature of man, the origin of justice, and the sta-
tus of non-human animals was relatively well-defined. In the eyes of 
Plutarch, who was an intellectually engaged Middle Platonist,16 the 
anthropocentric denigration of animals was a typical feature of Stoicism, 
in the same way as the defence of animal faculties was peculiar to 
Academic Skepticism (and, for different reasons, to Pythagoreanism). Of 
course, Plutarch's literary representation reshaped the contents of such 
traditions for specific ideological purposes, and even the pro-animals ar-
guments dating back to Neo-Academic polemics – which the Greek writer 
notoriously embraced and revitalized – inevitably underwent a process of 
rearrangement.17 Nevertheless, Plutarch's dialogues dealing with the pro-
                                                 
15  As is well-known, Plutarch belonged to the generation which followed Seneca's one. 
He was born between 46 and 48 AD, while Seneca died in 65. To all appearances, most 
of Plutarch's works were composed in his later years (cf. Jones, 1966 and Delvaux, 
1995), and they thus reflect the cultural climate of the Roman empire at the time of the 
so-called Nerva-Antonine dynasty. Interestingly enough, however, Plutarch could 
personally see Nero, Seneca's rebel pupil, in 67, when the Roman emperor competed 
in the Pythian games at Delphi and the Greek writer was already in his twenties (cf. 
De E ap. Delph. 385B). As concerns, more specifically, the date of composition of De 
sollertia animalium, no definite pronouncement seems to be possible. Though 
consistent efforts have been devoted to establish the dialogue's 'dramatic' date on the 
basis of a reference to the 'old Vespasianus' (ὁ γέρων Οὐεσπασιανὸς, 474A), Bouffar-
tigue, 2012, XX-XXI, is certainly right in saying that similar elements (which might 
induce to place the conversation in the 80s-90s AD) 'ne nous permettont nullement de 
déterminer la date de la composition du dialogue'. 
16  On Plutarch's relevance in the context of ancient Platonism see Dörrie, 1971, 
Froideford, 1987 and Opsomer, 2007. As several scholarly surveys have pointed out, 
one of the most interesting aspects of Plutarch's philosophical reflection – one which 
challenges the old stereotyped division between New Academy and Middle 
Platonism – is the attempt to combine typical skeptic polemics (such as the claim of 
animal rationality) with dogmatic interpretations of Plato's texts: see e. g. Tarrant, 
1985 and Opsomer, 1998. 
17 Cf. Labarrière, 2005b, 24-25: 'malheureusement pour nous, nous ne connaissons 
qu'indirectement cette polémique au sujet de la raison des animaux, et il serait donc 
aussi téméraire que vain de chercher à savoir ce que professaient exactement, à 
supposer qu'ils aient explicitement professé quelque chose au sujet des animaux, des 
philosophes dont nombre d'entre eux, à commencer par Carnéade, se refusaient, tel 
Socrate, à écrire. […] S'il est sage de ne pas poursuivre plus loin cette petite reconst-
ruction, on doit en revanche insister sur l'utilisation de cette polémique par Plutarque 
et par Porphyre, deux de nos auteurs sources au sujet de cette polémique, les deux 
autre étant Philon d'Alexandrie et Sextus Empiricus, seul Philon prenant le parti des 
Stoïciens tandis que Sextus est peut-être le plus proche des Néo-Académiciens'. 
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blem of animal dignity and flesh-eating18 provide a highly eloquent (and 
globally reliable) framework to approach the early Imperial discussion on 
such themes – a discussion to which, as is well-known, Seneca made a 
thoughtful and original contribution.19 
In the present paper, I will focus on an interesting passage of Seneca's 
treatise On Clemency (De Clementia) where the topic of animal rights is exp-
licitly mentioned. To all appearances, this is the only passage in which the 
Latin philosopher employs the juridically and philosophically significant 
expression ius animantium, thus referring to a form of nature-based 'animal 
right'.20 Indeed, the intellectual relevance of such an expression and its 
incontrovertible connection to the topic of the 'extension' of justice are 
further highlighted by the use of the adjective commune. In Seneca's words, 
there would be a common right of living beings – commune ius animantium – 
forbidding to perpetrate certain acts of violence. On the whole, however, 
the passage seems to aim at maintaining the inviolability of human rights, 
paying special attention to the pitiful condition of slaves. Notoriously, one 
of the most typical aspects of Seneca's Neo-Stoic humanism is precisely the 
call for a mild treatment of slaves – a call based on the philosophical (and 
physiological) notion of human nature.21 Given the presence of such a 
                                                 
18  That is to say, De sollertia animalium, Bruta animalia ratione uti, and De esu carnium 
(which includes two different discourses and was even larger in its original form). 
Further references to animals-related issues can be found in De tuenda sanitate 
praecepta as well as in the Quaestiones Convivales. For a comprehensive discussion of 
these Plutarchean works in light of ancient and modern ethical debates see Tse-
kourakis, 1987, Del Corno, 2001 and Newmyer, 2005. 
19  I have tried to offer a general interpretation of Seneca's views on animals and man-
animal relationships in Tutrone 2012. Stimulating remarks on this subject, however, 
can also be found in Torre, 1995a, 1995b, and 1997. 
20  As far as I can see, this is even the only occurrence of such a notable iunctura in classical 
Latin. 
21 As the famous discussions of Ben. 3.18-28 and Ep. 47 show, Seneca's polemic against 
the cruel treatment of slaves relies on the Stoic ideal of a shared human nature (an 
ideal eloquently summarized by the opening maxim of Ep. 47: 'Servi sunt'. Immo 
homines). As mentioned earlier, the Stoics held that all human adults are naturally 
endowed with reason, a substantive quality that everyone should bring to completion 
by reaching wisdom. This is said to be possible irrespective of one's social status or 
material conditions, so both slaves and masters, kings and subjects, are portrayed as 
the actors of a common struggle for virtue. However, since the achievement of such a 
purely spiritual goal is considered the only crucial issue of human existence, scholars 
have justly remarked that the improvement of the slaves' condition cannot be 
regarded as a central matter per se by any Stoic philosopher (see, most recently, Bett, 
2012, 160-168). For the Stoa, life and death, richness and poverty, are mere indifferents 
(ἀδιάφορα); and as Seneca himself observes (Ben. 3.28.4-5), those enslaved by lust or 
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man-centered context, scholars have often overlooked the writer's explicit 
reference to the moral status of animals, although other meaningful details 
than the simple mention of a ius animantium point out the importance of 
this matter to our passage. As I shall try to show, Seneca's paraenetic 
argument succeeds in combining a peculiarly Stoic concern for the respect 
of human dignity with a more general defense of the natural order. This 
second aspect of the author's discourse includes an original consideration 
of the role of animals which echoes Sextian-Pythagorean views, but is 
organically integrated into the framework of Stoic cosmology. 
What follows should thus be taken as a representative case study, 
pointing to Seneca's insightful connection of humanism and naturalism. I 
will argue that the Roman philosopher's idea of nature and cosmic order 
reflects the characteristic ambiguity of the Stoic reflection on this matter – 
an ambiguity which opens the way to assimilating more general concepts 
of biological integrity. A particularly influential role in this respect seems 
to have been played by Seneca's deep-rooted inclination for ascetic mo-
ralism, ostensibly relying on his early adoption of Pythagorean doctrines. 
Indeed, not only did Seneca believe in a close relationship between ethics 
and observation of nature, but he also saw a theoretical continuity 
between the defence of man and the preservation of every animal's status. 
2. Kings, Slaves, and Moray Eels: Seneca on Nature and the Degeneration of Power 
Seneca's De Clementia is one of the birth acts of the long-lasting tradition of 
Fürstenspiegel or specula principis – the handbooks composed by educated 
advisers to instruct young princes at the beginning of their reign.22 Given 
                                                                                                    
gluttony are the real slaves, solely the sage being free. Indeed, Seneca's celebrated 
exhortations to brotherhood among masters and slaves, which have frequently been 
seen as enlightened anticipations of liberal attitudes (see e. g. Richter, 1958, Grimal, 
1978, 180-183 or Schirok, 2006), are more likely directed to an audience of Roman 
aristocrats (that is, to the author's peers) for the sake of their moral enhancement. And 
it is indisputable that such exhortations do not contain any allusion to a prospective 
abolition of slavery as an institution. As Bradley, 1986, 167, pointed out, 'since Seneca 
had no conception of solving the problem through encouraging a radical change in 
Rome's social structure, the course of action he took was to resist the common use of 
violence for cowing slaves into submissive acceptance of their condition in favour of 
an alternative which produced the same result, namely, the encouragement of servile 
acquiescence through token recognition of the slave's humanity'. After all, Finley, 
1980, 121-122, did not go too far by saying that 'the humanitas of Seneca and Pliny [...] 
served to reinforce the institution, not to weaken it'. And, once again, we should resist 
the temptation of teleological arguments, taking cognizance of the cultural difference 
between ancient and modern approaches to ethics. 
22 Though Seneca himself was deeply influenced by the Greek tradition of writings on 
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the obvious importance of sociopolitical issues to the argumentative 
construction of such works, it cannot be surprising that the author pays 
special attention to defining the limits of the ruler's action as well as the 
extent of the citizens' rights. Seneca was an experienced member of the 
senatorial elite, and his prime concern was to exhort Nero, his imperial 
pupil, to act in view of the general stability, that is to say, in accord with 
the prerogatives of old and new social agents. The so-called Julio-Claudian 
dynasty had already offered remarkable examples of autocratic 
government, making substantial changes to the traditional structure of 
Roman institutions, and it was quite understandable that Nero's newly 
started principate, overtly influenced by the mentorship of Seneca and 
Afranius Burrus, was regarded as a valuable opportunity of civic 
regeneration. The Senate and the heirs of the republican nobilitas were, of 
course, particularly keen to take advantage of this situation, but as far as 
we can judge from the text of De Clementia, Seneca believed that an 
effective solution to the early empire's political dilemmas could not be 
based on strategies of political restoration.23 As an original Stoic thinker, 
he tried to apply the theoretical inputs of Greek philosophy to the thorny 
problems arising from Rome's transition to a principate, even at the cost of 
readjusting (and integrating) the standard system of Stoic ethics.24 
As regards, in particular, the De Clementia, it has been persuasively 
pointed out that the Latin writer endeavors to combine at least three lines 
                                                                                                    
monarchy (περὶ βασιλείας) – a tradition including Xenophon's Cyropaedia and Isocrates' 
To Nicocles as well as a wide-ranging corpus of Hellenistic works – the De Clementia 
played a decisive role in the development of such a peculiar genre. Above all, while 
most Greek treatises did not survive the end of classical antiquity (or reappeared at a 
significantly later time), Seneca's paraenetic speech shaped the reflection of both 
medieval and Renaissance theorists: see now Stacey, 2007. On the Latin philosopher's 
debt to Hellenistic political thought see instead Adam, 1970, who nonetheless 
underrates the philosophical complexity of De Clementia. 
23 As Griffin, 1976, 100-103, remarked, Seneca's political program as an amicus principis 
differred consistently from the intransigent attitude of the senatorial opposition, 
although this was frequently inspired by Stoic principles as well: 'basing their entire 
conception of politics on the Senate', men like Thrasea Paetus or Barea Soranus 
'appreciated and used what libertas senatoria the new regime provided, but they could 
not accept Seneca's new ideology for the Principate, framed in terms of Greek kinship, 
nor his exclusively moral admiration of Cato and disapproval of Caesar's murder. 
Finally, they disagreed on the kind of Stoic justification to use for political retreat'. 
24 The general relevance of this point to a full undestanding of Seneca's thought has 
been perceptively shown by Inwood, 2005. By contrast, as is well-known, an age-old 
scholarly trend tended to see Seneca's works as a late (and often unfaithful) testimony 
to Greek philosophy. 
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of thought: firstly, the Roman view of clemency as a public virtue, which 
had already been turned into a central issue of political life by Cicero's 
Caesarian speeches, with enduring effects on the subsequent imperial pro-
paganda; secondly, the Hellenistic idea of kingship and monarchic everge-
tism, which had been at the centre of different theoretical elaborations; 
thirdly, the Stoic conception of moral virtues, whose traditional syste-
matization was conveniently revised by Seneca.25 The philosopher's main 
innovation, in this respect, concerns the transformation of clementia into a 
(if not the) fundamental virtue of human life. To the best of our 
knowledge, such a view reflects an original position of Seneca, for none of 
the Greek equivalents to clementia previously attested in Stoic sources 
seems to share a similar preeminence – neither φιλανθρωπία nor πραότης 
nor the Aristotelian-flavored ἐπιείκεια.26 Given the limited state of our 
evidence, however, it may suffice to highlight Seneca's ability in adapting 
                                                 
25 See Griffin, 1976, 141-171 and Malaspina, 2003. The highly influential role of Cicero's 
Caesarian speeches in the constitution of the Roman panegyric tradition had already 
been noticed by Romano, 1965. Most importantly, there is clear evidence that Julius 
Caesar himself conceived clemency as a calculated political strategy (cf. Cicero, Att. 
9.7c). A long-term perspective on the conceptual construction of clementia and its 
moral features has been adopted in Picone, 2008a, where proper attention is paid to 
the socio-anthropological implications of the theme (see, in particular, the contribu-
tions of Beltrami, 2008, Picone, 2008b and Casamento, 2008). On Seneca's debt to 
Cicero, however, see also Borgo, 1990, Malaspina, 2001 and 2005. It is worth 
mentioning that, as Griffin, 1976, 149-150, pointed out, after the battle of Actium the 
value of clementia became a foundational element of Augustan ideology, expressly 
recalled in official documents and artistic representations: an attitude which Nero and 
his shrewd entourage attempted to resume for their own purposes. 
26  Cf. Griffin, 1976, 154-171. Though Griffin offers a very sensible discussion of Seneca's 
relationship to Stoic and Aristotelian doctrines, much work is still to be done to fully 
understand the writer's conceptual endeavor. For instance, there is good reason to 
think that Aristotle's meta-juridical idea of equity (ἐπιείκεια) and its reception in 
Hellenistic thought had a much stronger impact on De Clementia than Griffin is led to 
assume. Indeed, even if it is true that 'Seneca's clementia bears a very ambiguous 
relation to law' (160), scholars like Giancotti, 1955 and Bellincioni, 1984 are right in 
pointing to the author's belief in a universal ideal of justice: an ideal overstepping the 
limits of positive law and requiring the rational practice of clemency (cf. e. g. 1.20.1-2, 
where clementia is described as a necessary improvement of the more basic virtue of 
iustitia; or 1.19.1-4, where clemency is said to derive from a naturae lex which is 
inherently higher than any particular ius). As Schettino, 1998, 216, remarked, 'la 
clementia ha, secondo Seneca, un valore superiore in quanto attraverso essa il principe 
si conforma alla legge di natura. Il diritto di natura, perfetto, si contrappone in Seneca 
al diritto positivo, imperfetto. […] La clementia è quindi l'attitudine al perdono che 
permette di superare i limiti posti dal diritto positivo e ciò in nome di una iustitia 
perfetta superiore appunto alle convenzioni, alle formule delle leggi'. 
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the principles of Stoic moral to the needs of Rome's new social order. 
Remarkably, this intellectual undertaking is carried out without going 
beyond the borders of the Stoic definition of virtue as a typically human 
and rational achievement. Already in the first section of De Clementia, Sene-
ca makes clear his adherence to the Stoa's ethical rationalism: 
That clemency, which is the most humane of virtues, is that which best befits a man, 
is necessarily an axiom, not only among our own sect, which regards man as a 
social animal, born for the good of the whole community, but even among those 
philosophers who give him up entirely to pleasure, and whose words and actions 
have no other aim than their own personal advantage. If man, as they argue, seeks 
for quiet and repose, what virtue is there which is more agreeable to his nature than 
clemency, which loves peace and restrains him from violence? Now clemency 
becomes no one more than a king or a prince; for great power is glorious and 
admirable only when it is beneficent; since to be powerful only for mischief is the 
power of a pestilence.27 
According to the Roman philosopher, even the Epicureans should 
agree that clemency is the most humane (and thus the most human, in a 
physiological sense) of moral virtues. Indeed, irrespective of Seneca's 
deliberate simplifications, it is true that both the Stoic and the Epicurean 
schools see the attainment of virtue or wisdom (the two terms being 
substantially synonymous) as a product of rational perfection, resulting in 
correct choices and behaviors.28 Consequently, only man qua rational 
being is reputed to be capable of ethical improvement and all-embracing 
social feelings. And, in turn, virtue has distinctively human features.29 In 
                                                 
27 Clem. 1.3.2-3: “Nullam ex omnibus virtutibus homini magis convenire, cum sit nulla 
humanior, constet necesse est non solum inter nos, qui hominem sociale animal 
communi bono genitum videri volumus, sed etiam inter illos, qui hominem voluptati 
donant, quorum omnia dicta factaque ad utilitates suas spectant; nam si quietem petit 
et otium, hanc virtutem naturae suae nanctus est, quae pacem amat et manus retinet. 
Nullum tamen clementia ex omnibus magis quam regem aut principem decet. Ita 
enim magnae vires decori gloriaeque sunt, si illis salutaris potentia est; nam pestifera 
vis est valere ad nocendum” (transl. Stewart, 1889). 
28 On the basically rationalist character of Epicurus' ethics see Nussbaum, 1994, 102-279, 
and Konstan, 2008. As Nussbaum, 1994, 114, observes resorting to the typical medical 
imagery of Epicureanism, 'Epicurus' diagnosis implies that there is a job of great 
urgency to be done. And since false belief is the root of the illness, the curative art 
must be an art that is equipped to challenge and conquer false belief. It must, then, be 
an art of reasoning' (cf. e. g. KD 20-21; Ep. Men. 124-125). Since nothing else but a 
correct use of reason in accordance with Epicurean philosophy can release from errors 
and lead to wisdom, it is clear that irrational animals cannot make substantive moral 
progress: see Dierauer, 1977, 194-198, and Dombrowski, 1984, 82, who both remark on 
Epicurus' peculiar form of anthropocentric rationalism. 
29 Cf. Seneca's thorough treatment of the subject in Ep. 121 and 124. Both these epistles 
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the Stoic system, as mentioned above, such an approach is emphasized by 
the ascription of a virtuous rationality to the gods and the cosmos. 
Thus, when Seneca asserts that clemency denotes the highest degree of 
humanitas, he is clearly describing it as the acme of Stoic virtue. Moreover, 
he is implicitly highlighting the rational character of clementia – a character 
inherent in the very definition of virtue and repeatedly recalled in the 
treatise. For a Stoic like Seneca, virtue is the teleological fulfilment of 
man's rational nature, and the humanness of clementia derives precisely 
from its genuine status of virtus. Far from being an irrational concession 
based on inner weakness, Seneca's notion of clemency requires a conscious 
process of deliberation, demonstating the agent's moderation and self-
control.30 The Latin philosopher is careful to specify that clemency does 
not contradict the traditional severitas (αὐστηρότης) of the Stoic sage – and 
this, of course, should be regarded as the main model of a wise ruler. 
Crudelitas, not severitas, would be the opposite of clementia, since the first is 
said to be a form of intemperance leading to excessive punishment (in 
poenis exigendis intemperantia animi).31 
More importantly, in the second book of the work (which is 
particularly concerned with theoretical issues and employs a technical 
philosophical vocabulary), clemency is sharply distinguished from venia 
or misericordia, the forgetful indulgence caused by emotional perturbation 
which the Stoic tradition considered a vice.32 As Seneca himself puts it, 
                                                                                                    
are discussed, with special regard to Seneca's ethics-based cosmology, in Tutrone, 
2012, 174-195. 
30 See especially the famous definitions of 2.3, which expressly connect clemency to the 
traditional Stoic virtues of temperantia animi and moderatio. Cf. Griffin, 1976, 157-158: 
'virtue, to a Stoic, is the exercise of reason. Seneca uses the words temperamentum, 
modus, and moderatio; his examples show he is thinking of the process of arriving at a 
decision based on reasons'. 
31 See 2.4.1-3. 
32 The last section of what survives of De Clementia (2.4-7) is devoted to establish such a 
fundamental distinction (a distinction which, of course, was of paramount importance 
to Seneca's integration of clementia into the conceptual framework of Stoic ethics). The 
Greek equivalents to venia and misericordia recurring in Stoic texts are ἔ λεος and 
συγγνώμη (see Diogenes Laertius, 7.123; Stobaeus, 2.7 pp. 95.24-96.9 W.), and such 
terms had already been translated as misericordia in Cicero's Tusculanae Disputationes 
(3.20-21; 4.16-18; 4.56), a work which exerted a profound influence on Seneca's philo-
sophical vocabulary (see Moreschini, 1977). Like Seneca, Cicero included impulsive 
mercy among the aegritudines animi and mantained that this was ill-suited to a wise 
man. Cf. Ramelli, 1998, 191-199, Schettino, 1998, 212-214, Konstan, 2001, 96-104, and 
2010, 31-32. Interestingly, according to Konstan, 2005, Seneca's identification of 
clementia with a stable and conscious state of mind, giving rise to coherent behaviors, 
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differently from misericordia, clemency 'accedes to reason' (clementia rationi 
accedit) and agrees with the Stoic sage's proverbial gravity (cum severitate 
illi convenit).33 
In light of such a basic ideological framework, there can be little doubt 
that the view of justice and social responsability underlying the De 
Clementia concerns primarily (if not exclusively) mankind. The author 
envisages an orderly society ruled by an utterly rational king. In a similar 
society, the clemency displayed by the monarch reflects his superior 
reason and shapes the citizens' equally balanced attitude.34 Justice, then, 
arises from a thoughtful feeling of philanthropy and reciprocal connection 
embodying the axioms of Stoic oikeiosis.35 It may thus appear surprising 
that in one of his most vehement arguments against the violation of social 
integrity (that is, against the predominance of crudelitas over clementia), 
Seneca evokes the authority of an extra-human right affecting every living 
being. This is indeed the passage I intend to focus on in the present paper 
– a passage which has aroused a certain amount of discomfort among 
Senecan scholars. In order to appreciate the proper meaning of the writer's 
statements, however, it is necessary to see them in their actual context, 
paying sufficient attention to what precedes and what follows Seneca's 
'animal rights' claim: 
It is creditable to a man to keep within reasonable bounds in his treatment of his 
slaves. Even in the case of a human chattel one ought to consider, not how much 
one can torture him with impunity, but how far such treatment is permitted by 
natural goodness and justice, which prompts us to act kindly towards even 
prisoners of war and slaves bought for a price (how much more towards free-born, 
respectable gentlemen?), and not to treat them with scornful brutality as human 
chattels, but as persons somewhat below ourselves in station, who have been placed 
                                                                                                    
relies on the common understanding of this word in late Republican and Imperial 
Latin: 'clementia was not regarded as a whimsical or arbitrary sentiment, like 
misericordia, with which it is sometimes paired, but rather as a stable disposition; 
hence it was naturally considered a virtue, like the Greek πραότης and ἐπιείκεια' 
(344). 
33 Cf. 2.4.3 - 2.5.1. 
34 The idea that a clement and sound government induces all the members of the 
community to lead a peaceful and tidy life is clearly expressed in 1.13 and 1.16. Of 
course, such a view is used as an argument to convince Nero of clemency's 
importance, in accordance with a paraenetic strategy which is central to the treatise: 
see Beltrami, 2008. 
35 The so-called οἰκείωσις theory – the doctrine on self-appropriation and social 
inclination which lays the foundations of Stoic ethical-political philosophy – has been 
at the centre of several scholarly reconstructions: see e. g. Engberg-Pedersen, 1990, 
Pemproke, 1996, Long, 1996b, Radice, 2000, and Bees, 2004. 
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under our protection rather than assigned to us as servants. Slaves are allowed to 
run and take sanctuary at the statue of a god, though the laws allow a slave to be ill-
treated to any extent, there are nevertheless some things which the common laws of 
living beings forbid us to do to a man. Who does not hate Vedius Pollio more even 
than his own slaves did, because he used to fatten his moray eels with human 
blood, and ordered those who had offended him in any way to be cast into his fish-
pond, or rather snake-pond? That man deserved to die a thousand deaths, both for 
throwing his slaves to be devoured by the morays which he himself meant to eat, 
and for keeping morays just in order to feed them in such a fashion.36 
In her careful treatment of Seneca's cosmology and political philo-
sophy, Jula Wildberger remarked on the unusual ('ungewöhnlich') nature 
of Seneca's appeal to animal rights in light of the standard Stoic view. Ho-
wever, she wisely observed that the argumentative context of such an 
appeal reveals the author's primary interest in human dignity – a fact that 
I consider almost indusputable.37 
At the same time, it is clear that Seneca could have easily avoided an 
explicit inclusion of non-human animals into the field of rights without 
altering the essence of his humanitarian claim. Instead, he chose to employ 
the word animans, which is virtually the broadest definition of living 
                                                 
36 Clem. 1.18.1-2: “Servis imperare moderate laus est. Et in mancipio cogitandum est, non 
quantum illud inpune possit pati, sed quantum tibi permittat aequi bonique natura, 
quae parcere etiam captivis et pretio paratis iubet. Quanto iustius iubet hominibus 
liberis, ingenuis, honestis non ut mancipiis abuti sed ut his, quos gradu antecedas 
quorumque tibi non servitus tradita sit, sed tutela. Servis ad statuam licet confugere; 
cum in servum omnia liceant, est aliquid, quod in hominem licere commune ius 
animantium vetet. Quis non Vedium Pollionem peius oderat quam servi sui, quod 
muraenas sanguine humano saginabat et eos, qui se aliquid offenderant, in vivarium, 
quid aliud quam serpentium, abici iubebat? O hominem mille mortibus dignum, sive 
devorandos servos obiciebat muraenis, quas esurus erat, sive in hoc tantum illas 
alebat, ut sic aleret.” I have slightly revised the rendering of Stewart, 1889, who, like 
many other modern editors, translated the Latin muraena as 'lamprey'. Since lampreys 
(Petromyzon marinus) are not able to eat or severely harm human beings, it is clear that 
Seneca's text refers to moray eels (most likely to the so-called Muraena helena), which 
can actually chop off human limbs. Even more remarkable is the fact that Stewart 
chose to translate the crucial expression commune ius animantium as 'the common laws 
of life'. 'Life' sounds more generic, and therefore more theoretically acceptable, than 
'animals' or 'living creatures' in the work of a Stoic supporter of anthropocentrism – 
and it is true that, as we shall see, Seneca's overall argument has a strong humanistic 
character. Nonetheless, it is not a broad concept of lex vitae which is recalled in our 
passage, neither is it methodologically correct to obscure Seneca's reference to a 
comprehensive biological category (animantes). 
37 Cf. Wildberger, 2006, II, 844-845 n. 1245: 'der Sache nach geht es aber auch hier um 
eine besondere Verpflichtung gegenüber Menschen und nicht gegenüber Lebewesen 
generell'. 
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beings available in Latin, as well as the expression commune ius that typi-
cally hints at the juridical notion of shared rights. Cicero, for instance, 
employs the same iunctura when he wants to refer to everyone's right to 
change citizenship (commune ius mutandarum civitatum),38 or, more gene-
rally, to a communal kind of right.39 Most importantly, like many other 
concepts of the Roman legal vocabulary, the expression finds application 
in the area of moral philosophy. When explaining the Stoic doctrine of a 
universal cosmopolis including all human beings, Seneca himself asserts 
that the basis of such a large society is 'a common right of mankind' 
(aliquod commune ius generis humani), clearly resulting from the above-
mentioned process of oikeiosis.40 
Hence, we should be prepared to cope with the fact that in De 
Clementia the author deliberately extended the range of his discourse. My 
main point, in this regard, is that the Stoic reflection on nature and its 
ethically binding rules leaves sufficient room for appeals to respect every 
animal's natural end. As is well-known, the teleological notion of natural 
law characterizing Stoic thought assumes that all animals, and the cosmos 
as a whole, are committed to fulfil their inherent physiological purpose.41 
                                                 
38   Balb. 30-31. 
39  See e. g. Caec. 94. In the later juridical tradition, and especially in the Digest, ius 
commune is repeatedly used to indicate a law (or a system of laws) regarding a wide-
ranging group, often in contrast with more restricted contexts: see e. g. Dig. 17.1.56; 
29.1.25; 29.1.36; 49.14.37. It is also worth mentioning that Roman legal writers are 
remarkably keen to debate the problem of animal rights as part of the central question 
of natural law: see Onida, 2002. 
40 Cf. Ep. 48.3. See also Apuleius, Metam. 3.8; Apol. 86, who attests the diffusion of this 
idea in non-philosophical contexts. As many scholars have pointed out, the texts of 
Seneca and later Stoic thinkers tend to eclipse the inherently exclusive character of 
Stoic cosmopolitanism, thus creating rhetorically powerful appeals for fellowship and 
brotherhood. It is certainly significant, however, that in the passage just mentioned 
Seneca's main point concerns the value of interpersonal friendship. And, as the Latin 
philosopher frequently declares, a true feeling of friendship can solely arise among 
sages (see e. g. Ep. 9.5; 81.12; 123.15; Ben. 7.12.2) – which is the standard Stoic view (cf. 
Konstan, 1997, 113). On the prominent role played by the Roman legal vocabulary in 
the construction of Seneca's thought see, instead, Inwood, 2005, 224-248. 
41 On the Stoic idea of natural law and its controversial ideological features see the 
accounts provided by Mitsis, 1994, 2003, and Vander Waerdt, 1994, 2003. Both 
scholars stress the pivotal role of nature in the conceptual structure of Stoic ethics, but 
they disagree on the interpretation of the Stoic attitude to natural norms. While 
Vander Waerdt contends that the Stoics appealed to a purely dispositional moral, free 
from external rules and based on the sage's perfect rationality, Mitsis argues for an 
intrinsic connection between inner intentions and externally imposed prescriptions. 
However, such an intellectually engaging debate does not seem to have relevant 
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This means that an immanent rational order underlies the existence of the 
different components of the world, including those which are not properly 
rational. As Seneca makes clear in one of his most 'technical' epistles, all 
animals but man are directed by a compelling instinct teleologically 
inspired by nature.42 Human beings are called to the superior exercise of 
reason, and it is a harmful infraction of the providential plans to betray 
this expectation. But it is equally dangerous to invert or distort the projects 
of nature through a vicious abuse of animal life, for in so doing man 
proves to misunderstand the cosmic order, and therefore to fail his 
rational mission. Of course, only man has the freedom to commit such 
cosmological transgressions by using the gift of reason for immoral aims, 
while irrational animals can simply comply with their vocation.43 
In the passage of De Clementia under consideration here, Seneca seems 
to discuss precisely a paradigmatic case of unnatural behavior infringing 
upon the dignity of both animals and humans. The historical character at 
the centre of the apologue, the infamous Vedius Pollio,44 incarnates the 
                                                                                                    
repercussions on the research path we are now following for the case of Seneca 
(whose original perspective on the notion of natural law has been usefully 
investigated by Inwood, 2005, 224-248). 
42  Ep. 121 (see especially 7-9 and 17-24). Cf. Wildberger, 2006, I, 241-243; 313-315. 
43 Interestingy enough, in Seneca's works the pre-defined instinctual condition of animals 
may sometimes appear as morally commendable, especially if compared to man's cruel and 
vitious behavior (see e. g. Ep. 60.2-4; 66.26-27). In De ira, 1.3.3-8, in particular, both virtues 
and passions are said to be an exclusive prerogative of man, who is thus charged with 
much more complex ethical responsabilities than animals. The same picture is drawn, with 
special reference to the problem of virtue, in Ep. 124.13-20, where non-human animals are 
recognized to achieve their own peculiar (and limited) form of moral perfection (in sua 
natura perfecta sunt). Such views, of course, reflect the traditional rationalistic approach of 
Stoicism to the whole sphere of inner life. 
44 From Seneca's age onwards, the cruelty and luxury of Vedius Pollio became a topos of 
historiography and moralizing literature (cf. Pliny, Nat. Hist. 9.77; Tacitus, Ann. 1.10; 
Cassius Dio, 54.23). Seneca himself provides a more detailed account of Pollio's 
merciless custom in De ira 3.40.2-5, where Augustus is said to have prevented such a 
wicked man from tossing a slave into his fishpond. The slave had broken a crystal cup 
during the dinner, and in order to dissuade Pollio from inflicting his shocking 
punishment, Augustus ordered that all the crystal cups were broken before his eyes. 
He also ordered that Vedius' deadly piscina was buried. Although the passage in De 
ira does not allude to any form of human or animal right, it, too, highlights Pollio's 
metaphorical tranformation into a bloody beast (fera immanis sanguinaria), desirous to 
see new kinds of torment. With some meaningful variations, the story is reported also 
by Cassius Dio, who relates Augustus' attempt of damnatio memoriae following Vedius' 
death. Similar to Seneca, Pliny the Elder points instead to the character's lust for 
sadistic contemplation. What both Seneca and Dio tend to overshadow, however, is 
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conscious subversion of man's physiological telos I have just mentioned – 
what the Stoic tradition defined as a διαστροφὴ τοῦ λόγου.45 Clearly, 
Pollio's deviation regards, first of all, his relationship to other men. As 
mentioned earlier, Seneca and the Stoa believed that the fullest expression 
of human reason is a wide-ranging sociability, which in the case of wise 
men reaches a truly cosmopolitan dimension. On the contrary, this wicked 
Roman notable directed his ingenious efforts to the establishment of a 
bloody, anti-human practice. Instead of developing a conscious feeling of 
reciprocal fellowship – that in Seneca's view should also include slaves – 
he devised a frightening (but fully rational) strategy of sadistic self-
satisfaction. As several scholars pointed out, in all of Seneca's works such 
an intentionally aggressive attitude characterizes a specific anthropologi-
cal type, underlying the description of different individuals: the tyrant. 
Indeed, from a Senecan perspective, tyrants are sensu lato all those men 
who exploit their position of power to enjoy deliberate acts of violence. As 
both the De Clementia and the De Ira show, such men get accustomed to 
brutality to the extent that they exercise it for mere hedonic purposes.46 
                                                                                                    
that Pollio was a friend and a political ally of the emperor, charged with thorny tasks 
concerning the province of Asia. As Syme 1961 has shown, he was one of those 
'valuable partisans of dubious morality', whom 'it may be expedient to curb or discard 
in the season of peace and ostensibly normal government' (28). Of course, as Syme 
makes clear contrasting literary and epigraphic evidence, the 'standard tradition knew 
nothing of the financial expert who set in order the affairs of Asia, and Cassius Dio 
can affirm that Vedius had performed no service of any note'. See also Africa,1995, 
who remarks on Adam Smith's ideological reinterpretation of the Pollio episode.  
45  As Bellincioni, 1978, 33-36, remarked, Seneca's view of vices and passions is totally in 
line with the Stoic idea of 'subversion of reason': 'per Seneca il male è conseguenza di 
una διαστροφὴ nel senso stoico più tradizionale, nasce dal pervertimento di una 
condizione naturale buona. […] Come per la componente animale il provvido 
insegnamento della natura può essere dagli uomini frainteso, sì che il piacere 
destinato alla conservazione della vita, viene ricercato per se stesso, così anche la pars 
rationalis può essere distolta dal suo fine […]. Anziché avvalersi dell'intelligenza per i 
fini conoscitivi a cui è destinata, per imparare a distinguere il bene e il male, e più 
ancora per indagare, sin oltre i confini del mondo, donde abbia tratto origine e a che 
tenda il moto incessante dell'universo, gli uomini l'hanno prostituita asservendola alla 
propria sete di possesso'. As is well-known, the concept of διαστροφὴ dates back to 
the origins of Stoicism. Zeno himself, the founder of the school, seems to have 
established such a close connection between misuse of reason and betrayal of nature, 
a connection consistently echoed by the Roman Stoics. Cf. Grilli, 1963, who recalls the 
cultural and lexical roots of this original Stoic tenet, and Adorno, 1998, who mantains 
that in Zeno 'la virtuosità e il vizio non sono dovuti a non sapere agire bene (prassi), 
ma sono dovuti ad una deviazione teoretica' (145). 
46 See especially the discussion of Bäumer, 1982, who focuses on the definition of feritas 
Commune Ius Animantium (Clem. 1.18.2): Seneca's Naturalism... 529 
A few chapters after our passage, the author asserts that tyrants are led 
by their feritas/crudelitas to excogitate new kinds of crimes, since they 
develop a perverse taste for the observation of human sufferings which is 
the exact opposite of the oikeiosis-based fellow-feeling.47 At first, Seneca 
adopts the peculiarly Platonic pattern of the tyrant's transformation into a 
wild beast,48 but then he goes as far as to claim that such an intentional 
cruelty is much worse than irrational beastliness. As the writer notices, in 
fact, bears, lions, serpents and other noxious animals show respect for 
their own species – thus staying within the boundaries of nature – while 
degenerated humans appear to take special pleasure in assaulting their 
fellow men.49 
From the traditional point of view of Stoicism, Seneca might have 
restricted himself to denouncing similar behaviors as immoral infractions 
of human nature. And indeed the main purpose of the passage on Vedius 
Pollio is to exhort to the respect of man's dignity, by appealing to 'the 
                                                                                                    
in De ira, and makes a stimulating comparison between Seneca's approach and Erich 
Fromm's theories on aggressiveness. Likewise, Mantovanelli 2001 remarks on the 
Roman thinker's depiction of sadistic attitudes (with special reference to powerful and 
wealthy men) and employs specific psychanalitical categories. Moreover, scholars 
have rightly insisted on Seneca's rationalist reading of similar vicious degenerations 
in accordance with the Stoic theory of passions. The topic is remarkably prominent in 
the Naturales Quaestiones (a work in which the relationship between natural order and 
moral laws is of central importance), but emerges from De Clementia as well. Before 
providing the above-cited presentation of clementia as the pinnacle of human virtues, 
for instance, Seneca observes that one should be careful in identifying clemency 
through its external signs, for 'there are some vices imitating virtues' (cum sint vitia 
quaedam virtutes imitantia, 1.3.1). Such a deceptive form of ethical imitation relies on 
the common rational character of both virtues and vices, and Berno, 2003 has 
perceptively pointed out that in many passages of the Naturales Quaestiones the author 
constructs a symmetrical or 'specular' representation of good and bad moral 
behaviors. Finally, it is perhaps worth mentioning that in Seneca's tragedies the tyrant 
figure is characterized by the same hedonistic and lucid use of violence: see e. g. the 
case of Thyestes, discussed in Picone, 1996 (but cf. also Mantovanelli, 1996, and 
Schiesaro, 2003). 
47 See 1.25-26. 
48 Cf. 1.25.1: ferina ista rabies est sanguine gaudere ac volneribus et abiecto homine in silvestre 
animal transire. On Plato's representation of the tyrant's symbolic metamorphosis see 
especially Rep. 565D-566A. Plato's description of tyrannical anthropophagy had a 
great impact on the subsequent literary tradition, and on Roman culture in particular: 
see Citroni Marchetti, 1991, 139. 
49 See 1.26.4-5. The idea that, due to his abuse of violence, man turns into an abnormous 
creature, much more dangerous than the wild beasts, is indeed a topos of early 
Imperial literature. Cf.  Bäumer, 1982 and Tutrone, 2010. 
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nature of the right and the good' (aequi bonique natura). The philosopher's 
prime concern is to remind Nero of the value of his subjects, who are still 
defined as 'free men' according to the Roman classical terminology 
(homines liberi, ingenui, honesti). As a Stoic, however, Seneca bases his 
exhortation on a general notion of human status and mutual affinity 
which includes prisoners and slaves as well (captivi et pretio parati). A sort 
of step-by-step argumentative structure underlies the whole passage, and 
it is clear that the writer's final goal is to reaffirm the rights of citizens 
against the abuse of monarchic power.  At the same time, both the political 
defense of free men and the humanistic concern for the condition of slaves 
rely on a foundational ideological level, namely on a highly comprehen-
sive conception of nature. 
As the last section of our passage reveals, Vedius Pollio's crime affects 
the status of both human and non-human animals, for it derives from an 
impious misunderstanding of the entire natural order. Not only did Pollio 
repudiate his rational vocation to inter-human sociability, but he also forced 
other living beings to support his unnatural and macabre hedonism. The 
syntactic coordination at the end of the text clearly points to the character's 
multi-faceted violation: in Seneca's terms, 'that man deserved to die a 
thousand deaths, both (sive) for throwing his slaves to be devoured by the 
morays which he himself meant to eat, and (sive) for keeping morays just in 
order to feed them in such a fashion'. Seneca's first censure clearly hints at 
Pollio's symbolic cannibalism as a tyrant – a point influentially stressed by 
Plato and used by the Latin author to emphasize the tyrannical distortion of 
human relationships. When eating the moray eels of his vivarium, as Roman 
luxurious aristocrats used to do, Pollio actually consumed the flesh of other 
men. He resorted to morays as to a medium enabling him to satisfy his 
conscious cannibalistic inclinations.50 Pollio's rearing of animals for such a 
perverse and unnatural purpose, however, is explicitly blamed by Seneca as 
a second, equally atrocious crime. In my view, it is this further explanation 
of Vedius Pollio's immorality that gives full meaning to the writer's claim of 
a ius animantium, as it testifies to Seneca's belief in a physical teleology 
regarding all living beings. 
In truth, as far as we can judge from its most common expositions, the 
Stoic finalistic cosmology did not pay much attention to the intrinsic telos 
                                                 
50 As Citroni Marchetti, 1991, 139-140 observed, 'le murene che Vedio Pollione alleva e 
che nutre con il corpo dei suoi schiavi non sono che un tramite per il divoramento da 
parte di Pollione stesso, un contenitore provvisorio attraverso cui il corpo del servo 
possa giungere al contenitore definitivo, il corpo di un altro uomo'. 
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of animals other than humans. As a rule, the Stoics put emphasis on the 
fact that irrational animals exist for man's sake, the whole cosmos being, in 
Chrysippus' words, 'a system constituted by gods and humans and all 
things created for their sake'.51 As Cicero's philosophical works show, this 
radically anthropocentric view met with considerable success among Ro-
man thinkers. Cicero's dialogue De Finibus, for instance, took up Chrysi-
ppus' highly representative opinion on animal soul: the pig, Chrysippus 
argued, has been given a soul which serves as salt and keeps its flesh from 
going bad.52 Generally speaking, the Stoa seems to have seen in the ani-
mals' usefulness to man their basic goal as components of nature.53 
At the very end of his Epistle 121, however, Seneca asserts a much mo-
re specific view of biological finalism which has been sometimes thought 
to entail original elements. After elucidating the Stoic theory of oikeiosis 
and its moral significance through various zoological examples, the Latin 
philosopher states that, at least in some cases, self-affection and self-
preservation should be considered the only telos of animal life.54 As the 
writer notices, all living beings, even the most elementary ones (taciti 
quoque et bruti), possess a natural inclination to love and protect themse-
lves, and some of them fulfil their teleological duty simply by taking care 
of themselves, for they are in no way useful to other beings.55 This means 
that the cosmos includes certain animals which are of no use to man, the 
allegedly predestined beneficiary of natural resources. Given the Stoics' 
decidedly anthropocentric approach to such issues, Seneca's claim is 
certainly worth of careful consideration, especially as we know that major 
Stoic thinkers endeavored to demonstrate the usefulness of apparently 
unpurposed animals like bedbugs and predators.56 In his highly proble-
                                                 
51 Cf. Stobaeus, 1.21 p. 184.8-11 W. (= SVF 2.527). See Sorabji, 1993, 123-126. 
52 Fin. 5.38. Cicero recalls Chrysippus' view also in Nat. Deor. 2.160, and the attribution is 
confirmed by several Greek and Roman authors (cf. Varro, Re Rust. 2.4.10; Pliny, Nat. 
Hist. 8.207; Plutarch, Quaest. Conv., 685C; Porphyry, Abst. 3.20; Philo, Opif. 66). The 
relevance of Stoic anthropocentrism to the construction of Cicero's ideal of humanitas 
has been properly highlighted by Rocca 2003, who focuses on the Roman orator's 
readaptation of Stoic cosmology and Peripatetic zoology in the second book of De 
Natura Deorum. On the Latin reception of anthropocentric philosophical patterns see, 
more generally, Lanata 1994. 
53 See Dierauer, 1977, 238-245. 
54 Ep., 121.24. 
55 Ibid.: Videbis quae aliis inutilia sunt sibi ipsa non deesse. 
56 According to Plutarch, Stoic. Rep. 1044D (= SVF 2.1163), Chrysippus mantained that 
bedbugs work as natural alarm clocks for men. Similarly, Cicero, Nat. Deor. 2.161, 
reports the Stoic view that wild and dangerous beasts help man exercise his courage. 
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matic reconstruction of Posidonius' thought, Karl Reinhardt argued that 
similar 'intra-organic' views of biological finalism, sometimes emerging 
also from Cicero's presentations, should be traced back to Posidonius 
(whom Reinhardt saw as a largely heterodox Stoic).57 More wisely, Urs 
Dierauer pointed out that in Stoic philosophy non-anthropocentric forms 
of physical teleology, clearly founded on the doctrine of oikeiosis, could 
coexist with fundamentally anthropocentric explanations. At least in some 
respects, the originally Aristotelian idea of internal organic telos would 
have been combined with the Stoic anthropocentric providentialism.58 
Seneca's striking assertion on the uselessness of elementary beings, 
however, induced Dierauer to remark on the Roman author's conceptual 
originality59 – a possibility which should not sound so unlikely in light of 
Seneca's deep-rooted scientific interests.60 
Whether or not Seneca enriched his school's physiology with personal 
                                                 
57 Cf. Reinhardt, 1926, 139-141. According to Reinhardt, Cicero's discussion of Stoic 
providential theology in the second book of De Natura Deorum is indebted to two 
different sources: the first one, highlighting the importance of 'internal' teleology in 
the life of organisms, is Posidonius, while the second one, pointing to the centrality of 
man in nature's plans, is an unnamed Stoic writer. Like many other exponents of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries Quellenforschung, however, Reinhardt relies for the 
most part on purely hypothetical assumptions – not to mention the fact that the focus 
of our investigations on Latin texts should be the Latin authors' own reception of 
previous debates for original purposes. 
58 See Dierauer, 1977, 241: 'anzunehmen ist vielmehr, dass eine stärker naturwissen-
schaftlich-teleologische Betrachtungsweise, wise sie wohl Poseidonios geübt hat, ganz 
im Sinne des Aristoteles in erster Linie für die eigene Erhaltung der einzelnen 
Tiergattung dienende Zweckmässigkeit des Körperbaus und Verhaltens hervorhob, 
ohne aber prinzipielle Zweifel an der universalen, anthropozentrischen Teleologie der 
Stoiker zu hegen'. 
59 Dierauer, 1977, 241, n. 12: 'wahrscheinlich handelts es sich hier um einen Gedanken 
von Seneca selber; darauf weist die zugespitzt antithetische Formulierung'. 
60 As Romano, 1994, 22, pointed out, Seneca's passion for naturalistic research dated 
back to a much earlier time than his encyclopedic Naturales Quaestiones. We know for 
sure that at a young age he wrote a treatise on earthquakes (De Motu Terrarum), which 
probably served as basis for the sixth book of Naturales Quaestiones (cf. Nat. Quaest. 
6.4.2 = fr. 5 Haase). Likewise, he published field-specific works dealing with 
astronomy, mineralogy, and zoology (De Forma Mundi, De Lapidum Natura, De Piscium 
Natura). One should not forget that one of Seneca's most influential teachers was 
Papirius Fabianus, a rhetorician and philosopher belonging to the Sextian school 
whom Pliny the Elder defines as naturae rerum peritissimus (cf. Nat. Hist. 36.125). 
Fabianus wrote a book on animals (De Animalibus), and as far as we know, his lost 
Causae Naturales (at least in three books) are the only systematic treatise in Latin 
dealing with natural sciences before Seneca's own Naturales Quaestiones (cf. Lana, 
1992, 117-122). 
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insights, he was certainly aware that the oikeiosis theory entailed an 
individual-based consideration of the notion of teleology. Though the 
Latin philosopher, too, believed that animals, plants, and the cosmos as a 
whole, exist for man's sake,61 he exhorted to take into proper account the 
vocation of each living being to fulfil its special aim. A large section of 
Epistle 121 is devoted to illustrate how different kinds of animals are 
providentially led to maintain and develop their natural status. An 
upturned turtle, Seneca argues, does not strive to return to its normal 
position because it feels pain. Rather, it is nature's immanent design which 
instils in the animal a compelling desire to reach its physiological 
condition (desiderium naturalis status).62 In an analoguous way, bees and 
spiders are driven to complete their admirable creations by the influence 
of an internal teleological force. According to Seneca, the regularity and 
promptness of such animals' behavior attest the fact that non-human 
beings act in compliance with nature's instinctual indications, and not on 
the basis of reason.63 On the one hand, of course, a similar approach 
belittles the moral value of animal agency – a point perfectly consistent 
with the Stoic view of ethics and justice – but on the other hand, it 
confirms the existence of pre-defined natural goals which are meant to 
shape the life of every living being. 
If we try to apply the basic tenets of this doctrine to the case of Vedius 
Pollio's morays, we can easily realize the character's culpability in respect 
to animal physiology (and to Stoic cosmology more generally). By 
transforming his vivarium into a bloody set for his own sadistic pleasures, 
Pollio originated a twofold subversion of nature's plans, for he forced the 
morays to become customary anthropophagists and departed from his 
natural inclination to rational sociability. He ceased to be 'a social animal, 
born for the common good' (sociale animal communi bono genitum), in the 
proper sense of Seneca's above-mentioned definition,64 and developed a 
paradoxical taste for the infringement of natural laws.65 
                                                 
61 See e. g. Ben. 2.29.1-4; 4.5.1-2 
62 Cf. Ep. 121.8-9. 
63 Ep. 121.20-24. 
64 Clem. 1.3.2. 
65 The symbolic association between man's moral degradation and his unnatural use of 
animals is indeed recurrent in Seneca's works. In a long and impressive passage of 
Naturales Quaestiones (3.17-18), for instance, the writer describes the perverse attitude 
of Roman banqueters, who enjoy observering the gradual death of surmullets: such 
voluptuaries are said to be totally forgetful of their human and social duties 
(including the participation in their kins' funeral, 3.18.6), while their lust for 
gastronomic pleasures results in a voyeuristic contemplation of animal suffering (cf. 
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It is no accident that the theme of natural law underpins the whole 
section of De Clementia which frames Pollio's story. In chapter 19, in 
particular, the author declares that the use of power should conform to 
nature's norms (naturae lex), avoiding inappropriate recourse to violence.66 
In order to demonstrate this assumption, Seneca employs a canonical 
argument of ancient political theory (an argument particularly befitting 
the case of monarchic government): the social organization of bees.67 
According to the Latin writer, nature has wisely deprived the queen bee of 
any sting, so as to provide a virtuous model (exemplar) for human kings. 
Nature, Seneca says, 'is wont to practice herself in small matters, and to 
scatter abroad tiny models of the hugest structures'. Hence, we humans 
'ought to be ashamed of not learning a lesson in behavior from these small 
creatures', especially in view of man's much more significant potential of 
aggressiveness.68 Clearly, if readers think back on the apologue of Vedius 
                                                                                                    
Citroni Marchetti, 1991, 161-166; Torre, 1997; Berno, 2003, 73-80, Gauly, 2004, 96-104). 
Similarly, in De Brevitate Vitae (13.6-7), Pompey's slaughter of elephants on the 
occasion of lavish circus games (cf. Cicero, Fam. 7.1; Pis. 65; Pliny, Nat. Hist. 8.7.20-21; 
Cassius Dio, 39.38) is presented as a presage of the civil wars (and of Pompey's own 
death in Alexandria). Seneca explicitly remarks that the Roman general changed the 
natural order of things (supra rerum naturam tunc esse credidit), by bringing to Rome 
'beasts born under a different sky' (beluae sub alio caelo natae) and by arranging an 
unequal fight between men and animals (bellum inter tam disparia animalia). Of course, 
in all of these cases, Seneca appeals to a notion of natural law primarily affecting man 
and his asymmetrical relationship to other living beings. The abuse of animals and 
natural resources is interpreted, first of all, as a sign of mankind's deviance from 
virtue and rationality. 
66 Cf. 1.19.1: Eo scilicet formosius id (scil. clementia) esse magnificentiusque fatebimur, quo in 
maiore praestabitur potestate, quam non oportet noxiam esse, si ad naturae legem conponitur. 
67  The example of bees' orderly society has recurred in the Graeco-Roman political 
discussion at least since the time of Plato (Polit. 310D-E; Rep. 520B) and Xenophon 
(Cyrop. 5.1.24). A few decades after Seneca, Quintilian (Inst. or. 5.11.24) suggests using 
the image of bees and ants in the exhortations to take care of the State (si ad curam rei 
publicae horteris), thus proving to consider it a standard rhetorical topos. See Nicolaye, 
2008.    
68 Cf. 1.19.2-4: “Exemplar hoc magnis regibus ingens; est enim illi (scil. naturae) mos 
exercere se in parvis et ingentium rerum documenta in minima parere. Pudeat ab 
exiguis animalibus non trahere mores, cum tanto hominum moderatior esse animus 
debeat, quanto vehementius nocet.” Similar assertions denote the inherent ambiguity 
of the Stoc idea of nature as a system involving both universal and particular 
dimensions – that is to say, both rational and instinctual life forms. Cf. Grimal, 1978, 
357: 'la notion de natura est ambiguë. Elle comprend, d'une part, l'être de tout ce qui 
existe, l'ensemble de ce que nous appelons la “création”, et, d'autre part, la nature 
personelle, propre à chaque être particulier. Zénon, déjà, semble ne pas avoir expliqué 
bien clairement sur ce point le sens qu'il donnait à sa formule. Cléanthe, lui, refusait 
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Pollio reported in the preceding chapter, they will be struck by the cha-
racter's inversion of physiological rules: in fact, not only did he scorn the 
example of animals, but he also used such beings to break the cosmic law. 
Though we can admit that Seneca saw a subtle link between the abuse 
of animals and man's immorality, however, his appeal to the value of 
justice with special reference to animals still needs full explanation. As 
stated earlier, the uncommon expression commune ius animantium, with its 
implicit connections to the Latin juridical vocabulary, openly hints at a 
broad view of justice and reciprocal duties. And even if other Stoic 
thinkers might have agreed that irrational beings should never be 
deviated from their natural goal, they would have hardly discussed such 
an issue in terms of rights and mutual obligations. In Stoic theory, reason 
is the necessary requirement to exercise any form of right, and animals are 
said to be irremediably devoid of logical faculties. I suggest that in our 
case (as well as in several other parts of Seneca's philosophical work) a 
further ideological element has contributed to extend the author's 
typically Stoic naturalism. In order to identify such an element, we must 
go back over Seneca's early training as a thinker, namely over his 
enthusiastic adherence to Neopythagorean ascetism. 
As is well-known, the very beginnings of Seneca's interest in 
philosophy coincided with his initiation into the rigorist school of the 
Sextii, a school deeply influenced by Pythagorean ethical and cosmological 
doctrines.69 Although Seneca was too young to listen to Quintus Sextius, 
the founder of the school and father of Sextius Niger, he repeatedly 
expressed admiration for Sextius' teachings in his writings, remarking on 
the substantial similarities between Sextian and Stoic principles.70 Most 
                                                                                                    
de prendre en considération les natures individuelles, affirmant que la fin suprême 
consistait à vivre en accord avec l'ensemble de l'univers. Chrysippe, au contraire, 
assimile le deux aspects, sans établir entre eux la moindre distinction'. 
69 For a comprehensive reconstruction of the Sextian school's history and thought see 
Lana, 1973 and 1992. The influence of Sextian thinkers like Papirius Fabianus, Sotion 
of Alexandria, and Quintus Sextus himself, on Seneca's philosophical views has been 
properly highlighted by Mazzoli, 1967, Griffin, 1976, 36-41, and Inwood, 2005, 7-22.   
70 See De ira, 2.36.1; 3.36.1; Ep. 59.7; 64.2-5; 73.12-15; 98.13; 108.17-19; Nat. Quaest. 7.32.2. 
The impact of Sextius' approach on Seneca's thought is even more evident if one 
thinks that most of the works just cited were composed by Seneca in his old age, while 
the writer's tirocinium took place in his early youth (cf. Mazzoli, 1967, 252-259). 
Remarkably, in Ep. 64.2 Seneca goes as far as to notice that Quintus Sextius was a Stoic 
malgré lui. Although Sextius denied to be an adhrent of Stoicism, Seneca deliberately 
connected his intellectual firmness – his vigor and animus – to the traditional ethics of 
the Stoa (lectus est deinde liber Quinti Sextii patris, magni, si quid mihi credis, viri, et licet 
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importantly, when he was still in his teens, Seneca became a passionate 
follower of two eminent Sextian thinkers, Sotion of Alexandria and 
Papirius Fabianus. As Seneca himself reports in Epistle 108, Sotion was 
particularly inclined to Pythagorean doctrines and practices, and he 
managed to instil in the young Lucius an ardent 'love for Pythagoras' 
(amor Pythagoras).71 Like Quintus Sextius, Sotion was a convinced vegeta-
rian and his inspired argumentations induced Seneca to adopt a vegeta-
rian diet. Seneca later gave up such a habit because of political and family 
reasons,72 but as he expressly points out in his epistle, all of the ascetic 
practices he embraced in his youth left a permanent mark in his view of 
life: 
Other resolutions have been broken, but after all in such a way that, in cases where I 
ceased to practice abstinence, I have observed a limit which is indeed next door to 
abstinence; perhaps it is even a little more difficult, because it is easier for the will to 
cut off certain things utterly than to use them with restraint.73 
Before starting to describe his adoption of vegetarianism following 
Sotion's exhortation, Seneca refers to a series of rigoristic practices 
(including dietary restrictions) he had learned from the Stoic Attalus – one 
of the three teachers of philosophy who shaped his approach to ethics, the 
other two being Sotion and Fabianus.74 While the Roman writer admits 
                                                                                                    
neget Stoici). Needless to say, Seneca's attempt of cultural assimilation denotes his 
Stoic-centred paraenetic attitude as well as his typical inclination to theoretical 
synthesis. At the same time, however, such a sharp remark relies on Sextius' actual 
acceptance of several Stoic tenets (cf. Lana, 1992, 110-115). And as we shall see, it was 
the Sextian careful integration of Stoic and Pythagorean doctrines which served as a 
model for Seneca's own extension of the idea of justice. 
71 Cf. Ep. 108.17. Interestingly, in Ep. 49.2 Seneca says that when he attended Sotion's 
lectures, he was still a puer. And all our evidence on such chronological matters 
(Jerome, Chron. 171B H.; Tacitus, Ann. 2.32; 85; Suetonius, Tib. 36) leads to suppose 
that the Roman writer followed his Alexandrinian teacher between 13 and 19 AD. See 
Mazzoli, 1967, 354-355 and Griffin, 1976, 37. 
72 In Ep. 108.22 the author mentions Tiberius' persecution of foreign rituals (alienigena 
sacra), which placed abstinence from meat under suspicion. Seneca's father, the 
famous rhetorician and odiator philosophiae, would have used this fact to divert his son 
from vegetarianism. Indeed, both Tacitus and Suetonius (see above n. 71) confirm 
Seneca's assertions on Tiberius' oppressive attitude, and they explicitly refer to the 
banishment of mathematici and magi – two terms perfectly according with the 
traditional description of Pythagorean philosophers. 
73 Ep. 108.16: Cetera proiecta redierunt, ita tamen ut quorum abstinentiam interrupi modum 
servem et quidem abstinentiae proximiorem, nescio an difficiliorem, quoniam quaedam 
absciduntur facilius animo quam temperantur (transl. Gummere, 1917-25). 
74 Ep. 108.13-16. Mazzoli, 1967, 258-259, has persuasively argued that Seneca became a 
pupil of Attalus after attending the lectures of Sotion and Fabianus. It is quite natural 
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that he later abandoned some intransigent forms of abstinence, he speci-
fies that such resolute self-denials served as preparatory steps towards 
reaching moral maturity. In Latin literature, the term abstinentia often 
characterizes the renunciative and frugal attitude of virtuous men, with 
special regard to ascetic abstensions based on ethical beliefs,75 and since in 
the very next chapter Seneca starts retracing his adhesion to Pythagore-
anism, the use of this word is far from being accidental. 
It is worth noticing that Seneca provides quite a detailed account of 
both Quintus Sextius' and Sotion's reasons for abstaining from meat. In the 
text of the epistle, Sotion acts as a persona loquens delivering a speech in 
support of vegetarianism – the allegedly original speech which convinced 
the young Seneca to become a vegetarian.76 Sotion distinguishes his own 
philosophical arguments from those of Sextius, inasmuch he admits his 
fascination with Pythagoras' theory of metempsychosis and considers 
flesh-eating a hazardous habit. Using other animals as food, he argues, can 
virtually lead to patricide, since a kind of cosmological kinship (inter omnia 
cognatio), founded on the circular transmigration of souls, connects human 
and non-human beings. This is, of course, a rhetorically elaborated 
presentation of the traditional Pythagorean view that men owe justice to 
animals on the basis of a common psychological condition – a view largely 
shared by Empedocles as well.77 According to the Pythagoreans – both 
                                                                                                    
to think that, as a genuine Stoic, Attalus induced his enthusiastic student (cf. Ep. 108.3) 
to definitely embrace Stoicism. He could, of course, rely on Seneca's acquaintance 
with several Stoic doctrines due to the Sextian school's strong inclination to Stoic rigo-
rism. And Attalus himself showed deep-rooted ascetic tendencies, which resembled 
the Sextian approach familiar to Seneca. Above all, the Latin author's statement that 
he returned to political life after following Attalus' teachings (deinde ad civitatis vitam 
reductus, Ep. 108.15) leads to see the Stoic instructor as the last step of Seneca's philo-
sophical training. 
75 It may suffice to recall the common Latin translation of Porphyry's Περὶ ἀποχῆς 
ἐμψύχων as De Abstinentia. In its general meaning of 'moral integrity', the term recurs 
in several literary texts (e. g. Cicero, Q. Rosc. 17; Off. 2.76; Sallust, Cat. 54.6; Tacitus, 
Agr. 9.4), but in the Imperial age the reference to ascetic restrictions seems to become 
predominant (e. g. Seneca, Ep. 49.12; Pliny the Elder, Nat. Hist. 26.13; Quintilian, Inst. 
1.7.9; Pliny the Younger, Ep. 7.1.6). Most importantly, when dealing with Tiberius' 
persecution of foreign cults, Seneca himself connects abstinentia and flesh-eating (quo-
rundam animalium abstinentia, Ep. 108.22). 
76  Ep. 108.17-23. 
77 On the attitude of Pythagoras and later Pythagoreans towards the problem of justice 
and vegetarianism see Detienne, 1970 and 1972, Burkert, 1972, 120-166 and Cornelli, 
2013, 69-71. Even though different lines of thought seem to have emerged during the 
history of the school, affecting especially its view of animal sacrifice, Pythagora's 
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Greek and Roman – a 'common right of living beings' actually exists and 
has a solid natural foundation.78 Notably, when Seneca introduces his 
Alexandrinian teacher's argumentations, he asserts that both Sotion's and 
Sextius' reasons for vegetarianism were high-minded (mirifica), thus 
showing his long-standing appreciation for Pythagorean ethics.79 
It is especially interesting to analyze Sextius' own explanations, for 
they reveal striking similarities with Seneca's ideas on the nature of vice 
and aggressiveness. Sextius is said to have proposed four different reasons 
for abstaining from animal food, none of them directly involving the 
doctrine of metempsychosis: 
Sextius believed that man had enough sustenance without resorting to blood (1), 
and that a habit of cruelty is formed whenever butchery is practised for pleasure (2). 
Moreover, he thought we should curtail the sources of our luxury (3); he argued 
that a varied diet was contrary to the laws of health, and was unsuited to our 
constitution (4).80 
Although, broadly conceived, Sextius' philosophy was very much 
indebted to Pythagoreanism,81 his arguments for a flesh-free diet seem to 
                                                                                                    
belief in a fundamental cosmological kinship is indeed well-attested. See e. g. 
Porphyry's remark (Vit. Pyth. 19) that according to the Samian philosopher 'all ani-
mated beings should be regarded as kindred (ὁμογενῆ)'. On Empedocles' acceptance 
of metempsichosis and refusal of bloody sacrifices see, instead, Balaudé,1997 and 
Steiner, 2005, 50-52. 
78  Significantly, Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 8.13, connects Pythagoras' prohibition of killing 
or eating animals to the philosopher's more general claim that animals share with us 
the 'common right of the soul' (κοινὸν δίκαιον ψυχῆς) – a concept very close to 
Seneca's commune ius animantium. 
79 It is probably no accident that in Brev. vit. 14.5 Pythagoras is the second thinker cited 
among the 'masters of liberal studies' (antistites bonarum artium), immediately after 
Zeno. Likewise, still in his late treatise De Beneficiis (7.21), Seneca regards the Pythago-
rean belief in metempsychosis as ethically fruitful (cf. Mazzoli, 1984, 955-956). As 
Griffin, 1976, 39, pointed out, 'in his old age, Seneca credited his conversion to both 
types of argument, still held the medical one true, but described his experience as 
“falling in love with Pythagoras”'. It should also be noted that the adjective mirificus is 
often used by late Republican and early Imperial writers to describe morally admi-
rable acts or persons (see e. g. Cicero, Off. 1.79; Sallust., Cat. 9.2; 51.5; Livy, 1.10.5). 
80 Ep. 108.18 (my numbering): “Hic (scil. Sextius) homini satis alimentorum citra sangui-
nem esse credebat et crudelitatis consuetudinem fieri ubi in voluptatem esset adducta 
laceratio. Adiciebat contrahendam materiam esse luxuriae; colligebat bonae valetudi-
ni contraria esse alimenta varia et nostris aliena corporibus.” 
81 Seneca, De ira 3.36, notoriously refers to Sextius' daily practice of self-examination – a 
practice commonly traced back to Pythagorean ascetism (cf. Porphyry, Vit. Pith. 40; 
Cicero, Sen. 38; and the comments of Riedweg, 2002, 33-34). Moreover, Griffin, 1976, 39, 
observes that when debating the issue of vegetarianism, 'Sextius probably did not deny 
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have been beed based on moral and medical considerations. Compared to 
that of Sotion, Sextius' approach was definitely more man-centered and 
avoided resorting to mystical eschatologies. Generally speaking, as 
Giancarlo Mazzoli pointed out, the paraenetic power of Sextian thought 
derived from a form of ethical eschatology, since, as far as we can see, the 
sublime goal envisioned by the school's founder was moral virtue and not 
an abstract metaphysical ideal.82 Clearly, this distinctive inclination to 
present the attainment of virtue in eschatological terms – that is, through 
vigourous exhortations to reach ethical goodness as an inherently divine 
status – was taken up by Seneca, since it perfectly accorded with Stoicism 
(and probably denoted the Stoic flavor of Sextius' own philosophy).83 
Furthermore, as the passage just quoted shows, Seneca also inherited 
Sextius' view of meat-eating as a spur to vice and luxury (materia luxuriae). 
                                                                                                    
the classic Pythagorean arguments, and those he preferred were now also ascribed to 
that sage' (see the famous speech of Pythagoras in Ovid, Metam. 15.60-478, as well as 
Plutarch, Esu carn. 995D-E; 999, and Clemens of Alexandria, Strom. 7.6.33, mentioning 
the Pythagorean Androcides). Finally, closer attention should perhaps be paid to 
Claudianus Mamertus' claim (De Statu Animae 2.8) that both Quintus Sextius and his son 
Sextius Niger conceived of the soul as incorporalis, illocalis and sine spatio capax. To all 
appearences, von Arnim (RE II A, 2041) was not far from the truth when he connected 
Sextian psychology to the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition, since all of Mamertus' 
description may well refer to the view that, as immaterial substances, souls are not 
bound to single bodies. And we should always be aware that late-antique authors had 
access to a considerable number of sources which did not survive to us. 
82 See especially Seneca's comments on Sextius' hortatory writings in Ep. 64.2-6. As the 
author makes clear, the focus of Sextius' discourse was happiness (beata vita), and this 
was depicted as both lofty (in excelso) and accessible to willing men (volenti 
penetrabilis). Cf. Mazzoli, 1967, 234: 'ecco dunque in che veramente consiste […] la 
novitas filosofica, la romanità stessa di Sestio e della sua secta: nell'aver collocato al 
vertice dello sforzo escatologico umano non le astratte entità metafisiche della 
tradizione pitagorica e platonica, ma la sapientia, intesa come supremo ideale etico, 
verso cui conduce la voluntas, non la διάνοια'. 
83 One should also add, however, that the Stoic idea of a virtuous imitation of the gods, 
originating from the claim that divine beings provide a model of perfect rationality, 
was largely influenced by Pythagorean-Platonic ideals. The concepts of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ 
and ὁμιλία πρὸς τὸν θεὸν stemmed from the thought of early Greek philosophers, and 
even Roman thinkers like Cicero (Fin. 3.73) and Seneca (Vit. Beat. 15.5) referred to such 
tenets as to vetera praecepta, thus hinting at their clearly pre-Stoic origin. On Seneca's 
significant use of the topos of imitatio deorum, in particular, see Grimal, 1978, 393-397, 
Mazzoli, 1984, 962-972 and Setaioli, 2007, 356-357. Remarkable evidence on this matter 
is provided also by Epictetus (e. g. Diss. 1.12.7-8; 2.14.12-13; cf. Long, 2002, 144-147), 
though the Stoic assimilation of Pythagoras' maxim 'follow god' (ἕπου θεῷ) in the 
framework of natural theology seems to date back to Zeno (SVF 1.182 = Epict. Diss. 
1.20.14-16). 
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Seneca's philosophical works are full of polemic attacks against the 
morally degenerated practice of ostentatious banquets, and the unnatural 
sophistication of meat plays a prominent symbolic role in this respect.84 
Again, the Stoic appeal to a life in accordance with nature and the ascetic 
tendencies of Roman Pythagoreanism appear to be strictly related in the 
Latin writer's thought.   
Even more relevant is the connection established by Sextius between 
carnivorous diet and habituation to cruelty. As we have seen, in De 
Clementia (as well as in De Ira) Seneca offered an insightful interpretation 
of the origin of gratuitous violence which has been perceptively compared 
to Erich Fromm's psychanalitic explanation.85 A crucial element of this 
interpretation is the distinction between ira and feritas/crudelitas, a 
distinction drawn in light of a progressive psychopathological theory. 
According to Seneca, anger and aggressivity are wrong rational responses 
to external inputs. They are rational because in Stoic theory all passions 
(πάθη) originate from a conscious assent of reason (συγκατάθεσις) during 
the process of knowledge. Nonetheless, they are wrong since they 
undercut the hieratic impassivity (ἀπάθεια) of the sage – a spiritual 
condition to which every human being should aspire in order to fulfil his 
natural vocation.86 In so far as anger or ira remains within the boundaries 
of this definition, it depends on recognizable triggering factors and can be 
therapeutically treated. As mentioned earlier, however, Seneca's prog-
ressive reading of the phenomenology of aggressiveness contemplates a 
further step, characterized by assuefaction to violence. At such a stage, 
man's harmful behavior is no more roused by external events, but results 
                                                 
84 See e. g. Cons. Helv. 10; Prov. 3.6; Vit. Beat. 11.4; Brev. Vit. 12.5; Ep. 59.13; 89.22; 110.12-
13; 122.4; Nat. Quaest. 13.17-18. As Gourévitch, 1974 remarks, Seneca devotes careful 
reflection to the ethical implications of nutrition and digestion, enhancing his 
theoretical arguments through specific medical notions. 
85 See Bäumer, 1984, 96: 'Fromm differenziert parallel zu Seneca zwischen Aggression 
(ira bei Seneca) und einer nur dem Menschen eigenen Leidenschaft zu zerstören 
'Destruktivität' (feritas). Sowohl Seneca als auch Fromm sehen Aggression (ira) als 
reaktives Verhalten, während Destruktivität (feritas) durch Ursachenlosigkeit cha-
racterisiert wird' (cf. Fromm, 1975, 11). 
86 See e. g. Sorabji, 2000, 45-46: 'The Stoics not only talk of will, but also, relatedly, rep-
resent the emotions as voluntary, though for quite different reasons from those of 
Sartre in modern times. Seneca introduces his analysis of anger by saying that its 
whole point is to show whether anger is controllable, and it will be controllable, on his 
view, only if it is a judgement dependent on assent and will. […] It is necessary for 
those who claim to be able to attain freedom from emotion to treat the emotions as in 
some sense voluntary. Accordingly, this happens not only with the Stoics, but with 
the Pyrrhonian sceptics, who also aspire to freedom from emotion'.   
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from a perverse taste for cruelty. This is the stage labelled as feritas or 
crudelitas, powerfully exemplified by the case of Vedius Pollio and bloody 
tyrants. 
In Seneca's view, a fundamental element for the development of crude-
litas is indeed the transformation of brutality into a pleasure (voluptas).87 It 
is therefore remarkable that an analogous process of habituation to 
aggressiveness, arising from the discovery of a peculiar pleasure, is 
identified by Sextius in meat-eating. As Seneca's epistle puts it, the 
laceration of animal flesh easily turns into a pleasure and generates a 
deep-seated inclination to cruelty (crudelitatis consuetudo). As is well-
known, such an argument figured prominently amongst the moral claims 
advanced by ancient vegetarians, and, to all appearences, Sextius himself 
had derived it from his Pythagorean background.88 What is more relevant 
to our present concern is that Seneca apparently retained the basic 
ideological structure of Sextian-Pythagorean reasonings and applied it to 
wider ethical-political issues. Of course, the author of De Clementia integ-
rated the idea of a gradual degeneration of vice into the more complex 
framework of Stoic philosophy, thus substantially changing and enriching 
its intellectual meaning. Nevertheless, it is very interesting to notice how 
the Sextian-Pythagorean approach to the problem of violence found an 
echo in central theoretical principles of De Clementia and De Ira, 
contributing to define Seneca's highly original view of rage, power, and 
psycho-physiological involutions. 
Give the long-term influence of Sextius' Neopythagorean doctrines on 
Senecan thought,89 it seems very likely that also the passage on Pollio in 
                                                 
87 Cf. especially Clem. 1.25.2: 'the reason why cruelty (saevitia) is the most hateful of all 
vices is that it goes first beyond the ordinary limits, and then beyond those of 
humanity (excedit fines primum solitos, deinde humanos); that it devises new kinds of 
punishments, calls ingenuity to aid it in inventing devices for varying and 
lengthening men's torture, and takes delight in their sufferings (delectatur malis 
hominum): this accursed disease of the mind reaches its highest pitch of madness when 
cruelty itself turns into pleasure, and the act of killing a man becomes enjoyment (cum 
crudelitas versa est in voluptatem et iam occidere hominem iuvat). 
88 See e. g. Plutarch, Soll. An. 959D-960A; Esu Carn. 998A-C, and Porphyry, Abst. 1.47, 
who clearly rearrange a much older tradition of polemical arguments. Cf. Li Causi, 
2010. 
89 See Mazzoli, 1967, 239-240: 'prodotta e caratterizzata da giovanile entusiasmo, su-
perata appunto perciò in breve volger d'anni da più organiche e razionali esigenze 
filosofiche, la fase pitagorica di Seneca non si esaurì tuttavia senza lasciare – come 
tutte le profonde passioni della giovinezza – un'orma riposta nel memore spirito del 
pensatore. E' un'orma ch'egli avverte sempre e che talvolta confessa, non senza un 
certo diveritito imbarazzo' (cf. e. g. Ep. 102.2). Similarly, Griffin, 1976, 37-42, notes that 
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De Clementia betrays the traces of such an influence. Seneca's enlargement 
of the traditional Stoic concept of ius naturae and his fascinating depiction 
of a two-sided violence – affecting both men and animals – may thus 
imply a suggestive rhetorical combination of different ideas of nature. The 
humanistic selective concern of Stoic ethics has been cleverly merged with 
a more inclusive and symbolically appealing notion of natural right, 
resembling the Pythagorean belief in a cosmological inter-specific justice. 
Such a claim shall appear even less unusual if one bears in mind that the 
impact of popular Neopythagorean views on De Clementia has long been 
identified by scholars. Above all, it has been remarked that the very 
representation of the ruler as 'law embodied' or 'living law' (νόμος 
ἔμψυχος), skilfully employed by Seneca in the first part of his treatise, is a 
typical feature of Platonic-Pythagorean political theories, as attested, for 
instance, by the chronologically controversial writing On Law and Justice of 
Pseudo-Archytas.90 Notoriously, in the philosophical debate of the late 
Republic and the Imperial period, the connection between Platonism and 
Pythagoreanism becomes even stronger than in the past centuries,91 and 
                                                                                                    
'even in the last year of his life, he (scil. Seneca) found Sextius' writings deeply 
moving, and bitterly lamented the premature death of this nova et Romani roboris secta' 
(cf. Nat. Quaest. 7.32.2). Additionally, 'Fabianus' influence on Seneca was certainly 
lasting. […] From his Sextian days, Seneca retained throughout his life the habit of 
examining his coscience every night, and his great interest in medicine may have 
received its first impulse then'. 
90 See Adam, 1970, 45-56. Adam regards On Law and Justice (Περὶ νόμου καὶ δικαιοσύνης) as 
an authentic work of the fourth century BC philosopher Archytas of Tarentum, while 
she refers to the Neopythagorean writers Diotogenes, Ecphantos and Sthenidas (cf. 
Stobaeus, 4.7 pp. 263.14-279.20 W.) as to a 'Zeugnis einer hellenistischen Richtung der 
Werke περὶ βασιλείας' (14). In recent times, however, several scholars have inclined to 
connect all such authors to the tradition of Post-Hellenistic Pythagoreanism (see e. g. 
Haake, 2003 and Murray, 2007), a tradition which, as we have seen, was of central 
importance to Seneca's Bildung. As van Nuffelen 2011, 116, observed, 'it is significant, 
and not merely an accident of survival, that the formula of nomos empsychos itself 
surfaces for the first time in Pseudo-Archytas, dated after 50 BC, and become very 
popular later on' (cf. also Aalders, 1969). Interesting notes on Seneca's reception of the 
Pythagorean-Platonic notion of νόμος ἔμψυχος can also be found in Ramelli, 2006, 96-
102, who nonetheless applies to the Latin thinker the old-fashioned (and rather 
confusing) label of 'eclectic' Stoic.   
91 As Centrone, 2005, 569, pointed out in his discusson of the Pseudo-Pythagorean poli-
tical treatises, 'the symbiosis of Platonic and Pythagorean ideas in the philosophies of 
the early Academy make it difficult to separate out elements in these texts that might 
ultimately be of Pythagorean origin. Distinctively Platonist doctrines come to be 
presented as Pythagorean, and it is difficult to establish whether the authors of the 
treatises considered themselves Platonists rather than Pythagoreans'. 
Commune Ius Animantium (Clem. 1.18.2): Seneca's Naturalism... 543 
the school of the Sextii cogently exemplifies such a multi-faceted process 
of doctrinal assimilation. 
Interestingly enough, Quintus Sextius' son and successor, the phy-
sician Sextius Niger, who wrote a book On Materia Medica (Περὶ ὕλης) in 
Greek, is said to have credited the folk view that eating salamanders sti-
mulates sexual desire.92 In all likelihood, when providing pharmacological 
advice, Niger did not conform to his father's vegetarian discipline. 
Nevertheless, he is mentioned as a follower of Asclepiades of Bithynia,93 
and thus as an adherent of the Empiric school of medicine which, as 
Celsus makes clear,94 considered vivisection a uselessly cruel practice. On 
the whole, the philosophical profile of Sextius Niger seems to suggest that 
in the lively enviroment of the Sextian school cultural beliefs and interests 
could vary, vanish, or adapt to different contexts. It is more than 
reasonable to imagine that something analogous happened also in the case 
of Seneca, formerly a tirunculus of Sotion and Fabianus.95 Among other 
things, Seneca never lost sight of the strict relationship between ethics, 
cosmology, and naturalistic research, occasionally inclining to a rhe-
torically alluring enlargement of his anthropocentric moral.   
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